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By common consent, Raja Rao (1908-2006) is one of ‘the founding fathers’ of the 
Indian fiction in English, the other two being Mulk Raj Anand (1905-2004) and R.K. 
Narayan (1906-2001).
3
 Unlike the other two, Rao is famous for his spiritualism and 
deep-seated respect for caste hierarchy. Although he came in close contact with 
Western culture, it cannot be said (of him) that he developed a positive attitude to it. 
He is, in fact, a cultural chauvinist insofar as the construction of Indian 
cultural/national identity is concerned.
4
 For him, the decisive marker of the Indian 
nation is Hinduism. A robust egalitarianism enables Anand to imagine the community 
of the nation across caste and class divides; yet he too is hesitant to do the same with 
regard to the communal and gender divides. Rao is even more parochial than Anand 
in that his ‘imagined community’ tends to be a replica of the age-old structure of 
Indian society.
5
 Keeping all the different hierarchies in place, the status quo is 
zealously maintained in Kanthapura (1938) and the handful of novels that Rao wrote 
after India had achieved political independence in 1947. In what follows, focusing on 
the treatment of (Indian) Muslims in the novel, I analyse Kanthapura, one of the most 
                                                          
1
 This article is dedicated to the fond memory of my dear father, Md. Mujtaba Hossain, who passed 
away in July 2011. I would like to thank Rick Hosking and the anonymous reviewers of this essay 
whose insightful criticisms have gone a long way towards shaping the argument I have sought to 
construct in it. Slightly altered, the title of this article is from Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its 
Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993). I have extensively 
drawn on Chatterjee here.  
2
 Raja Rao, Kanthapura (1938; New York: New Directions, 1963) 181. Subsequent references are to 
this edition. Incidentally, E.M. Forster chose to represent Hindu culture/India by the temple and 
Muslim culture/India by the mosque, that is, by places of worship of the two communities in his 1924 
novel A Passage to India. In contrast, British culture/India is represented in the novel by the club, a 
secular place. For all his liberal humanism, Forster tended to see the religious/spiritual India as the 
Other of the secular West. For a biting critique of Forster and his novel, see Edward W. Said, Culture 
and Imperialism (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993) 241-8. 
3
 See chapter 3 in William Walsh, Indian Literature in English (London and New York: Longman, 
1990).   
4
 In a sense, Rao is also a cultural syncretist, building bridges between East and West, especially in his 
second novel The Serpent and the Rope. But my point here is that he is ideologically committed to the 
rich Indian (read Aryan/Hindu) culture of the long past. Like Rao, Anand could never have written, 
‘Brahmin is he who knows Brahman.’ The tall brahminic claim is from The Serpent and the Rope 
(London: John Murray, 1960) 7. Subsequent references are to this edition. 
5
 In my view, both Anand and Rao are ‘mythmakers’ insofar as the construction of the nation is 
concerned, for both are selective, though not to the same degree. Both are capable of creating the 
‘myth’ of an inclusive Indian nation. The now-famous expression ‘imagined community’ is from 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. 
ed. (London and New York: Verso, 1983). 
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celebrated Indian English novels dealing with the Indian national movement of the 




II. Imagining the (Indian) nation  
Nations are, as Benedict Anderson has so incisively suggested, ‘imagined 
communities,’ that is, ‘cultural artefacts.’7 For Anderson, the discursive reality of the 
nation precedes its political reality. That is to say, before the nation comes into being 
politically, it has to be imagined as such. If so, where does this imaginative 
construction take place? One of the two sites Anderson identifies for such 
construction to come about is the (realist) novel, the other being the newspaper (both 
products of what Anderson calls ‘print-capitalism’): ‘For these forms provided the 
technical means for “re-presenting” the kind [sic] of imagined community that is the 
nation.’8 
How far is Anderson pertinent to an anticolonial national formation such as 
India? Partha Chatterjee, to cite the best known case, has strong reservations about 
Anderson’s claim (as Chatterjee puts it)  
 
that the historical experience of nationalism in Western Europe, in the 
Americas, and in Russia had supplied for all subsequent nationalisms a set of 





For Chatterjee:  
 
The most powerful as well as the most creative results of the nationalist 
imagination in Asia and Africa are posited not on an identity but rather on a 
difference [sic] with the “modular” forms of the national society propagated 




Hence agreeing with Anderson amounts to, according to Chatterjee, ‘reducing the 
experience of anticolonial nationalism to a caricature of itself.’11 Yet Chatterjee 
concedes what one may consider one of Anderson’s key arguments: ‘Anderson is 
entirely correct in his suggestion that it is “print-capitalism” which provides the new 
institutional space for the development of the modern “national” language.’12 
One is, in effect, led back to where one started from, that is, Anderson. 
However differently anticolonial nationalism defines itself, in choosing both to locate 
and assert its very difference in the domain of culture rather than politics (politics 
being the domain where difference is to be challenged, to be on a par with the 
coloniser), as Chatterjee has shown to have been the case in the context of Indian 
                                                          
6
 The (Hindu) nationalist intelligentsia tended to treat Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism as deviations of 
Hinduism. That is, these faiths were not as decidedly (construed as) the Others of Hinduism as Islam 
has always been and perhaps is even today. 
7
 Anderson 4. 
8
 Anderson 25. 
9
 Chatterjee 4-5. Chatterjee is by far the most incisive postcolonial critic of Anderson. 
10
 Chatterjee 5. 
11
 Chatterjee 5. 
12
 Chatterjee 7. 
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nationalism, it makes the same use of (print) culture as its adversary, for the use of 
culture as a means to a political end is itself a bourgeois practice, first seen during the 
rise of the bourgeoisie in Europe.
13
 Insofar as the leadership of Indian nationalism 
came from the new, English-educated, urban-based Indian bourgeoisie, ‘spawned and 
nurtured by colonialism itself,’ as Ranajit Guha puts it, culture had to be its site as 
well as articulation of difference.
14
 
If Anderson and Chatterjee engage in a dialogue as to how the nation is 
imagined across a range of cultural and historical formations, Fredric Jameson and 
Aijaz Ahmad engage in another, regarding the figuration of the nation in the so-called 
third-world literature. As is well known, Jameson shook up the placid world of 
academic criticism by his essay ‘Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational 
Capitalism.’ Jameson postulates: 
 
Third-world texts, even those which are seemingly private and invested with a 
properly libidinal dynamic – necessarily project a political dimension in the 
form of national allegory: the story of the private individual destiny is always 





Critics have identified numerous shortcomings of this ‘sweeping hypothesis,’ as 
Jameson himself characterises it.
16
 They are too well known to bear repetition. As 
with Anderson, I will limit myself to the most publicised critique of Jameson, the one 
by Ahmad. Of the many examples of ‘positivist reductionism’ enumerated by Ahmad 
in his devastating riposte, the one most pertinent to the present discussion has to do 
with the homogenisation by Jameson of ‘nationalism itself’ as if it were ‘some unitary 
thing with some predetermined essence and value.’17 ‘There are hundreds of 
nationalisms in Asia and Africa; some are progressive, others are not,’ Ahmad 
reminds Jameson.
18
 What Ahmad says can be developed further: not only are any two 
(third-world) nationalisms distinct from each other; each is a complex phenomenon 
on its own right, marked by tensions, contradictions, and ambivalences of its own.  
Ironically, by downplaying its complexity, Jameson divests nationalism of its 
historical character at a time when it is being explored with far greater rigour and 
vigour than ever before.
19
 The tensions informing ‘the nation-concept’ are precisely 
what constitute its appeal to contemporary theorists.
20
 As Tom Nairn contends, ‘it is 
                                                          
13
 In her study of Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1987), Nancy Armstrong has forcefully argued the point in a feminist context.  
14
 Ranajit Guha, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard UP, 1997) 5. 
 
15
 Frederic Jameson, ‘Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,’ Social Text 15 
(Fall 1986): 69.  
16
 Jameson 69.  
17
 Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures (London and New York: Verso, 1992) 97, 
102. 
18
 Ahmad 102. 
19
 The knowledge that Jameson is a major Marxist cultural theorist gives the irony an extra edge.  
20
 I have taken the term from Elleke Boehmer, Stories of Women: Gender and Narrative in the 
Postcolonial Nation (Manchester and New York: Manchester UP, 2005) 4. In her book (Stories), 
Boehmer offers a powerful argument as to why nationalism is still relevant to the postcolonial world. 
The recent theoretical interest in nationalism derives its impetus from the general distrust of ‘grand 
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an exact (not a rhetorical) statement about nationalism to say that it is by nature 
ambivalent.’21 
 
If the ambivalent figure of the nation is a problem of its transitional history, its 
conceptual indeterminacy, its wavering between vocabularies, then what effect 





 The closest Bhabha comes to answering the question is to 
suggest that ‘the constitutive contradictions of the national text are discontinuous and 
“interruptive”.’23 To put it plainly, the ‘conceptual indeterminacy’ of nationalist 
ideology translates into narrative/discursive ambivalence, which is why 
narratives/discourses of the nation can never happen to be free from (obvious) 
contradictions. Of the many contradictions of Indian nationalism informing 
Kanthapura, the one I will be primarily concerned with in this essay is its communal 
construction of Indian national identity: the conflation of Indianness with Hinduism, 
‘a nationalist imagination dreaming up the nation-state of the future as a Hindu 
Samrajya or a Ramrajya.’24 
 
III. The historical context of Kanthapura 
Never before was colonial India so full of political activity as from the time of the 
introduction of the Ilbert Bill in February 1883.
25
 Newer and newer trends emerged, 
sometimes modifying the older ones, at other times rejecting them altogether. It is 
both imperative and instructive to read Kanthapura in the context of these 
developments in Indian politics. Only then one is able to understand the exclusionary 
nature of its conceptualisation of the Indian nation. In what follows, I attempt to 
provide a broad overview of Indian national politics from the time of the partition of 
Bengal in 1905 to its culmination in the Quit India movement in 1942. The focus is 
consistently on the complex and evolving contours of Hindu-Muslim relationship.    
Some of the noteworthy developments in the arena of Indian national politics 
in the first decade of the twentieth century are: first, the partition of Bengal in 1905 
and the Swadeshi movement (1905-8) it gave birth to (incidentally, Swadeshi was the 
first openly militant anti-British nationalist movement of the twentieth century); 
secondly, the birth of the All-India Muslim League in 1906; thirdly, the Swadeshi 
riots of 1906-7; fourthly, the split of the Indian National Congress in 1907 into 
moderates and extremists; and, finally, the Indian Councils Act of 1909, which gave 
the Muslims of British India a separate electorate. So the overall picture of the period 
can be summarised as one of conflicts and tensions, of disintegration, of ‘things 
fall[ing] apart.’  
                                                                                                                                                                      
narratives’ in the West, manufacturer as well as sufferer of World War I and II, though the trend is fast 
gaining ground in other parts of the world as well. As such, the approach is rather critical/cynical than 
sympathetic, with the failures of nationalism given more attention than its achievements. 
21
 Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain (London: Verso, 1981) 348. 
22
 Homi K. Bhabha, ‘Introduction: Narrating the Nation,’ Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1990) 2.  
23
 Bhabha, ‘Introduction’ 5. 
24
 Guha 62. 
25
 The Indian National Congress was formed in 1885. 
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It can be safely proposed that British-Indian relationship following the Ilbert 
Bill was in the main one of collision. The steady corrosion of British-Indian relations 
at the time may lead one to expect to see a greater cohesion among different Indian 
communities, especially between Hindus and Muslims. Contrary to expectation, 
however, an unprecedented hostility obtained between the two communities, despite 
some genuine efforts to bring them closer together. Needless to say, the frequency of 
communal riots with which the nineteenth century ended is its most eloquent 
testimony.  
To be fair, both sides were to blame, if not to the same degree. Mutual distrust 
grew because one had begun to pursue a revivalist agenda for some time now, while 
the other turned more and more towards a separatist politics, both more or less 
communal in character. In other words, the paths of the two communities had begun 
to diverge. The action of the one provided an excuse for the (re)action of the other. To 
borrow from Salman Rushdie, the obnoxious politics of blame had been born.
26
 ‘It 
became customary for both Hindu and Muslim newspapers,’ writes Abdul Hamid, 
‘not only to accuse individuals but also to cast aspersions on the other community. 
The signs of approaching strife were unmistakable.’27 The enlightened white sahibs 
knew all too well how to exploit these dark situations best.   
In India, the last quarter of the nineteenth century saw two distinct tendencies 
growing up simultaneously: on the one hand, after decades of hostility and 
indifference towards Western education and culture, Muslims took to reformism in 
the same spirit as the Hindus had done half a century ago; on the other hand, the 
Hindus turned away from social reformism to religious revivalism.
28
 As the century 
wore on, Hindu revivalism gathered momentum, engulfing the whole of India. More 
specifically, Bengal (the power base of the British at the time), Bombay (then the 
Presidency of Bombay, now the Province of Maharashtra with Mumbai as its capital), 
and Punjab became major centres of Hindu revivalism.  
A whole range of (patriotic) activities were undertaken to highlight the 
superiority of Indian (read Hindu) civilisation over all the other civilisations of the 
world – both past and present. The materialist West was deliberately contrasted with 
the spiritualist East. To highlight the spiritual heritage of India, the sacred texts of 
Hinduism such as the Vedas and the Gita were elaborately commented upon.
29
 In the 
heat of the argument, some even went on to claim for Hinduism the status of the ‘only 
true and universal faith.’30 As part of a larger programme to invest Hinduism with 
                                                          
26
 Salman Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981-1991 (London: Granta, 1991) 
57. 
27
 Abdul Hamid, Muslim Separatism in India: A Brief Survey: 1858-1947 (n.p.: Oxford UP, 1967) 48. 
Given the Paki(stan) bias of Hamid, one may ask with no use of irony whether he himself has learnt 
anything from the history of Hindu-Muslim ‘strife’ he is talking about. 
28
 The Muslim apathy to westernisation has come to be questioned. Scholars now hold that Muslim 
response to Western education was far from homogeneous. Hence to claim that a North Indian Muslim 
was as averse to the benefits of British culture as a Bengal(i) Muslim is no more than an 
oversimplification. See Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1972). 
29
 In one sense, the uses of these texts were also secular for they were to serve the national movement. 
For a discussion of the nationalist appropriation(s) of Hindu sacred texts (especially the Gita), see 
Josna E. Rege, Colonial Karma: Self, Action, and Nation in the Indian English Novel (Hampshire and 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 1-21.  
30
 Dayananda Saraswati cited in Crispin Bates, Subalterns and Raj: South Asia since 1600 (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2007) 96. Dayananda founded the Arya Samaj in 1875.  
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historicity, a number of biographies of Sri Krishna appeared in Indian languages, 
implanting him as the ‘ideal hero’ in Indian (Hindu) consciousness.31 The Aryan 
ancestry of the Hindus was emphasised in order to infuse them with a sense of racial 
pride. As if to consolidate it further, heroes from the historical past, especially those 
who had successfully resisted the waves of Muslim invasion, were reinstated in public 
memory, with the (sometimes oblique, sometimes obvious) message to re-enact those 
heroic deeds of the past to rid India of her present-day subjugation. Bengalis revived 
the memories of Pratapaditya and Sitaram; Maharashtrians, of Shivaji; and Punjabis, 
of Ranjit Singh.
32
 In each of these centres of Hindu revivalism, in short, there 
flourished a number of pro-Hindu organisations (whose pseudo-religious activities 
often led to communal riots), an array of Hindu utsavas (festivals) and melas (fairs), a 
spate of new journals, and a body of literary works based on history, whose revivalist 
gospel charged Hindu India with new life but threatened Muslim India with doom.
33
 
The revivalist clamour of the day was loud enough to drown the old voices of 
harmony, moderation and reformism for a while.  
How did the Muslims react to the revivalist craze of the day? The story of the 
Muslims of British India begins with the Great Rebellion of 1857. Rightly or wrongly, 
it was the Muslims who were held responsible for what the British tend(ed) to call the 
Mutiny. ‘In the British view,’ writes Thomas Metcalf, ‘it was Muslim intrigue and 
Muslim leadership that converted a sepoy mutiny into a political conspiracy, aimed at 
the extinction of the British Raj.’34 For most of the third quarter of the nineteenth 
century, therefore, the Muslim community was in murky waters, held in contempt and 
distrust by the colonial masters. On the other hand, the Muslim perception was one of 
disillusionment. Consequently, the most vital task before the leaders of the Muslim 
community after 1857 was to repair Anglo-Muslim relations, to bring about, in the 
words of Peter Hardy, ‘rapprochement between Islam and the nineteenth-century 
Western-dominated world.’35 They decided on a two-part programme: to establish in 
the eyes of the white rulers of India that they were allies not enemies of white rule 
and, for the first part of the programme to bear fruit, to reconcile themselves and the 
community they represented to Western education and culture, which in turn entailed 
dispelling the strong anti-British sentiments of the community. After the memories of 
1857 had grown a little paler, the British policy was also geared to promoting the new 
secular ambitions of the Muslims. At the turn of the century, the British were so 
openly committed to safeguarding Muslim rights and interests as to invite charges of 
partiality from the Hindus. 
So Hindus and Muslims were not the only actors on the Indian political scene 
at the time under discussion here. Right at the centre were the British, desperately 
looking for a new ally to meet the extremist challenge of the Swadeshi years.
36
 Soon 
                                                          
31
 See Amales Tripathi, The Extremist Challenge: India between 1890 and 1910 (Bombay: Orient 
Longmans, 1967) 1-2. 
32
 Tripathi 73-74. 
33
 The Muslim intelligentsia invariably saw Hindu revivalism as a threat to the existence of Muslim 
community in India.  
34
 Thomas R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt: India, 1857-1870 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1964) 
298. 
35
 Hardy 104. 
36
 When the Congress split in 1907, the Swadeshi movement had already moved into its extremist 
phase and was to enter the terrorist phase soon. 
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an opportunity offered itself. Towards the end of 1906, when (Hindu) India was still 
simmering with resentment over the partition of Bengal, Lord Minto, the first 
twentieth-century liberal Viceroy of India, received a thirty-five-member Muslim 
delegation. In his reply to the address presented by the delegation, Minto submitted 
that he was as ‘firmly convinced’ as they ‘that any electoral representation in India 
would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal 
enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities 
composing the population of this continent.’37 The ‘political rights and interests of 
[the Muslims] as a community will be safeguarded,’ he assured them, ‘by any 
administrative re-organization with which I am concerned.’38 Not surprisingly, in the 
space of barely a quarter of a year, the All-India Muslim League was founded.  
The next decade – that is, the 1910s – was a quieter one, insofar as nationalist 
agitation in India is concerned. The main reason was the First World War. With the 
advent of the War, the political climate in India began to cool down, with the political 
parties competing with one another to put on show how loyal they were to the British 
Raj. By contrast, nationalist activities geared up abroad, especially in North America 
where through the weekly paper The Ghadar ‘the entire nationalist critique of 
colonialism ... was carried, in a powerful and simple form, to the mass of Indian 
immigrants.’39 At home, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Annie Besant started the Home 
Rule movement based in Bombay and Madras respectively. As the name of the 
movement suggests, the demand was self-government for India on the lines of the 
white colonies after the War was over. The two most remarkable events of the decade 
were the appearance of Gandhi in 1915 on the Indian political scene and the Lucknow 
Pact of 1916. The former would have a long-term impact on national politics in 
general and Hindu-Muslim relationship in particular: Gandhi would relentlessly work 
for Hindu-Muslim amity till the very end of his life, consistently earning undue 
criticism from almost all vested quarters in the process. The latter – the pact between 
the Congress and the League – would reconcile the interests of the two communities 
for a while but would soon fall apart. The issue of separate electorate would again 
prove a bone of contention.  
For the national leadership in India, the second decade of the twentieth century 
was one of steady disillusionment. The ‘great expectations’ that they had entertained 
during the War did not materialise when it was over. They had expected that Britain 
would grant India self-rule in return of her huge contribution to the overall War effort. 
But the leaders of both Hindu and Muslim communities were soon to be disillusioned. 
If the Government of India Act of 1919 disappointed them all, the British attitude to 
Turkey angered the Indian Muslims in particular. It was clear from the Treaty of 
Sevres signed in May 1920 that the Ottoman Empire was already a thing of the past. 
The anger led to the resurgence of what has come to be known as the Khilafat 
movement. Although the movement concerned the Muslims of India who looked upon 
the Caliph of Turkey as the spiritual head of Muslims all over the world, Gandhi 
chose not only to align himself with it but also to become, along with the two Ali 
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 Lord Minto quoted in Hardy 155. 
38
 Minto cited in Tripathi 163. The Muslims of British India were finally awarded separate electorate 
by the Indian Councils Act of 1909. 
39
 Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Mukherjee, Sucheta Mahajan and K. N. Pannikar, 
India’s Struggle for Independence: 1857-1947 (New Delhi: Penguin, 1988) 155. 
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brothers, its moral and political anchor. By getting himself involved in the Khilafat 
movement, Gandhi was able to turn it into, in the words of B.R. Nanda, ‘a rallying cry 
for Hindu-Muslim unity.’40 
If such developments as the Rowlatt Bills, the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, the 
Khilafat and Non-cooperation movement brought the Hindus and Indian Muslims 
together for a while, other developments in the late 1920s worked to pull them apart, 
creating in the process a chasm that would continue to widen and would eventually 
pave the way for the decisive entry, spread and consolidation of communalism in 
Indian national politics, culminating in the partition of India. Chief among them was 
the appointment of the all-White Simon Commission, so called after the name of its 
chairman. The primary task of the Commission was to decide ‘whether India was 
ready for further constitutional progress and on which lines.’41 The formation of the 
Commission without a single Indian member on it was enough to provoke opposition 
from the various nationalist fronts operating at that time. The consequence was either 
total boycott of the Commission by most of them or cold indifference to it by the rest. 
Ironically, the boycott did not result in a positive outcome. That is to say, it failed to 
generate a greater understanding between the different political parties claiming to 
represent the different communities of India. Instead, each decided to pursue its own 
parochial interests, in the process divesting the Congress of the legitimacy of its claim 
to represent all Indians. From now onward, two distinct but inter-related tendencies 
would run parallel in Indian national politics: one would emphasise the fight against 
the colonial rule; the other, the conflict of interests of the different communities of 
India.           
In 1928, the political parties of India jointly issued what has come to be 
known as the Nehru Report, after the name of Motilal Nehru (father of Jawaharlal 
Nehru). The Report was an answer to the British ‘challenge’ that the Indians were 
incapable of devising ‘a concrete scheme of constitutional reforms which [would 
have] the support of wide sections of Indian political opinion.’42 Since it was an 
outcome of joint efforts, the Report ‘rejected the principle of separate communal 
electorates on which previous constitutional reforms had been based.’43 Both sections 
of the Muslim League – the one that had  refused to have anything to do with the 
Congress and the other led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah that had agreed to cooperate 
with the Congress – saw in the rejection of ‘the principle of separate communal 
electorates’ a threat to Muslim interests. To protect Muslim interests, Jinnah came up 
with his famous ‘Fourteen Points’ which the Congress could not accept because 
accepting them would mean, the Congress leadership thought, weakening the spirit of 
nationalism on the one hand and strengthening that of communalism on the other. 
There was another side to the issue too. Hindu communalism had also become a force 
too strong not to be taken cognizance of. Hindu communal parties such as the Hindu 
Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) were out now to safeguard 
Hindu interests. The Communal Award of 1932 was thus an inverse recognition of 
Indian nationalism having become communal in character, for even the Congress did 
                                                          
40
 B. R. Nanda, Gandhi: Pan-Islamism, Imperialism and Nationalism in India (Bombay: Oxford UP, 
1989) 102. 
41
 Chandra et al. 260. 
42
 Chandra et al. 263. 
43
 Chandra et al. 263. 
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not raise any protest against it. Just as the colonial government could no longer deny 
the force of Indian nationalism of the day, Indian nationalism could no more hide its 
communal character.  
Within the Congress, the leadership passed from Gandhi to Nehru and his ilk 
who embraced a Marxist-socialist politics, rejecting the kind of politics that Gandhi 
stood for. The socialist focus of the new Congress leadership meant that from now on 
(the causes of) class conflicts would receive far greater importance than (those of) the 
communal ones. Of all the national agendas, the problems of peasants and workers 
became the number one agenda for the Congress. The question of Hindu-Muslim 
unity was no longer the central issue. Under the Government of India Act of 1935, the 
Congress went into provincial elections in 1937, won a majority in most of the 
provinces and formed government in them. Interestingly, during its twenty-eight-
month-long rule, the Congress did little to improve Hindu-Muslim relations but 
everything to redress the plight of the working classes. The Congress provincial 
governments resigned in October 1939, and in the din and bustle of the Second World 
War that had started in September 1939, the Hindu-Muslim issue was almost 
forgotten.  
So during the decades between the 1900s and the 1930s, Indian politics had 
become a site of conflictive interests and Indian nationalism a constellation of 
parochial nationalisms. In the hullabaloo of Hindu revivalism and Muslim separatism, 
Indian nationalism could no longer remain Indian nationalism, pure and simple. With 
the two main communities looking askance at each other, it could only be either 
Hindu or Muslim nationalism, one informed by revivalist and the other by separatist 
ideology. Yet here and there a lone voice, albeit subdued, could be heard, urging 
moderation, sanity, and tolerance; projecting an Indian identity free from 
considerations of caste, class, or creed; and thus inviting fellow Indians to accept the 
cultural plurality that is India. If Rabindranath Tagore is one such voice, Gandhi is no 
doubt another. But the Rao of Kanthapura is certainly not such a voice.  
 
IV. The nation and its fragments in Kanthapura 
In erasing the Hindu-Muslim question from its construction of the nation, Kanthapura 
participates in parochial nationalism, a type of nationalism that takes care of the 
interests of one particular community (the Hindus) and ignores those of the Others. 
The nationalist imagination that goes into the making of the novel is all the more 
dangerous in that it chooses to pit itself against one of the Indian minorities (that is, 
the Indian Muslims) and cast them as the Other of the nation, instead of confronting 
the real Other (British rule) face to face. In line with mainstream nationalist discourse, 
Kanthapura forms national identity on the basis of Hinduism. In this formulation, to 
be an Indian is to be, first of all, a Hindu. Exclusion on the basis of 
community/religion is, however, not the only exclusion. There are some others along 
lines of gender, class, caste and age. These multiple exclusions from the figuration of 
the national subject have been, and continue to be, vigorously contested not only in 
the (historical) fiction but also in other literary genres of the post-independence 
period. Scholarly discourses too have questioned what Josna Rege phrases as ‘the 
success of the nationalist synthesis.’44 
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In her provocative study, Myths of the Nation: National Identity and Literary 
Representation, Rumina Sethi reads Kanthapura, one of the classic texts of the Indian 
national movement, in terms of its selective (because of class and gender biases) 
figuration of Indian national identity. According to Sethi, Rao is ‘ahistorical’ (and the 
charge is a serious one) in his ‘representation of the contemporary politics of the 
1930s.’45 Sethi substantiates her case by way of showing how Rao uses Gandhian 
ideology in his novel: now upholding, now downplaying, that is, using it to serve his 
own ideological purpose (ideology appropriating ideology). Conceding that Gandhian 
philosophy is full of ‘contradictions,’ caught as it is between ‘fixity and resistance,’ 
Sethi argues that Kanthapura derives its tensions not so much from these Gandhian 
contradictions as ‘from the way in which they have been written into the novel.’46 In 
other words, Rao appropriates Gandhian thought so as to cover up his ‘implicit bias 
towards brahminism which can be seen as a feature of chauvinist Hinduism employed 
by revivalist nationalists.’47 Through a detailed analysis of the treatment of the two 
‘fragments’ of the nation – peasants and women – Sethi is able to demonstrate the 
exclusionary character of the nation Rao constructs in his novel.
48
 Deploying a new 
critical idiom that came into prominence in the wake of (postcolonial) cultural studies 
in the late 1980s, Myths of the Nation is one of those rare works on Indian English 
fiction that have persistently stressed, contrary to the dominant critical trend of the 
time, the need ‘to pose a series of interruptions in one’s conceptualization of a 
homogeneous cultural identity.’49 
My approach to Kanthapura is both a continuation and an expansion of what 
Sethi has done in her outstanding work. Although Sethi is aware of the exclusion of 
minorities (especially Indian Muslims) from the projected nation of Kanthapura, she 
does not pay (in fact, does not choose to pay) these ‘fragments’ of the nation the 
amount of attention they really deserve. In my opinion, the question of 
exclusion/inclusion of the (Indian) Muslims in the novel is as important as the other 
two exclusions. For Rao would not have been able to write Kanthapura at all, or at 
least not the way in which he did, if he had not chosen to treat the (Indian) Muslims 
the way in which he has treated them in it.  
Kanthapura is set in the (early) 1930s, incontrovertibly one of the most 
challenging decades in the history of Indian nationalism, marked by the increasing 
impact of the Gandhian programme of civil disobedience. Responding to the call of 
M.K. Gandhi to join the programme, a small community living in the village of 
Kanthapura – which is, according to C.D. Narasimhaiah, ‘[a]n unmistakable South 
Indian village’ – gets involved in the national struggle for independence under the 
leadership of Moorthy, the Gandhi of Kanthapura.
50
 In the process, the villagers lose 
everything (they had). Still they remain hopeful that today or tomorrow ‘he will bring 
us Swaraj, the Mahatma. And we shall all be happy.’51 In ending on an unmistakable 
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note of triumphant optimism, Kanthapura is typical of nationalist (historical) fiction. 
This optimism is indicative of the approach of nationalist historical fiction to the past 
it deals with: it is neither nostalgic nor critical as revivalist historical fiction tends to 
be. It is resolutely focused on the future. Elleke Boehmer has drawn attention to the 
contrastive moods of ‘idealistic hope of renewal’ and of ‘pessimism of late imperial 
culture’ characterising the literatures of the period when Kanthapura was published 
(that is, early twentieth century): the former marking the literatures of peripheral 
colonies, while the latter, those of the colonial centres.
52
 
Both M.K. Naik and Narasimhaiah commend Kanthapura for its ‘authentic’ 
portrayal of life in rural India.
53
 If one accepts rural India as Hindu India, there will be 
nothing to take issue with. If otherwise, there will possibly be no end of reservations. 
Even though Narasimhaiah seems more perceptive than Naik in noticing ‘socio-
economic divisions’ in Kanthapura (the village, and, significantly, not in Kanthapura, 
the text), he does not pause to tease out the implications of these divisions in terms of 
caste/class hierarchy and the power relations they assume.
54
 Kanthapura has ‘a 
complex structure’ because ‘it is there in the village, has always been there, in this 
land of villages.’55 By refusing to question socio-economic reality and its 
reverberations in the daily life of the people concerned, Narasimhaiah accepts no 
discrepancy between reality/history and its discursive/novelistic representation. In 
simple terms, Narasimhaiah does not read culture/literature in terms of the ideology it 
is embedded in or seeks to project. Yet he is not totally unaware that all art is 
selective. Explaining why Rao does not ‘individualize’ non-brahmin characters, 
Narasimhaiah argues ‘it is obviously because he doesn’t like to crowd his canvas.’56 
As if to apologise for Rao, he adds: ‘But even then he would not dismiss [them] 
without a thought for he has felt for them in their wretchedness.’57 Not surprisingly, it 
does not strike Narasimhaiah that the national ‘canvas’ of Kanthapura is absolutely 
free of Muslim presence.
58
 Nor is there representation of any other community in it. 
The national ‘canvas’ of Kanthapura is crowded only with Hindus, just as the village 
of the title is an exclusively Hindu village. The only Muslim character in the novel is 
the policeman Badè Khan, the (surrogate?) villain, who comes from outside. He is not 
a Kanthapurian and is thus disqualified to be an Indian. For, on an allegorical plane, 
Kanthapura is India or, as one critic puts it, ‘pre-independence India in miniature.’59 
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One is able to form, I contend, a fairly accurate idea of the nation Rao intends 
to construct in Kanthapura from a consideration of the way in which the very first 
chapter of the novel is structured. In fact, it is possible to read it as the ideological 
blueprint of the entire novel as far as imagining the (Indian) nation is concerned. The 
chapter is composed of five small units of unequal length: three basically descriptive 
units followed by two mainly narrative ones. The first one introduces Kanthapura, the 
village of the title and also the scene of narrative action; gives its precise geographical 
location; and ends with an invocation to Kenchamma, the local goddess.
60
 The ritual 
of beginning an (individual/collective) activity by invoking gods/goddesses is a 
standard Hindu practice (the equivalent Islamic/Muslim practice is to recite a certain 
verse from the Qur’an). Readers are thus positioned as to what to expect in what 
follows. They are about to enter a Hindu world which is strategically given the name 
of ‘Bharatha’ in the final unit in which ‘Gandhiji’ appears.61 Brahmins enjoy the 
topmost position in the Hindu social order. Accordingly, some of the prominent 
brahmin men and women of Kanthapura are introduced in the second unit, technically 
the first unit describing the population of the village. It is not without significance that 
the smallest unit is the third one which deals with the non-brahmin population of the 
village: pariahs, potters, sudras, weavers, and so on. This confinement of non-
brahmin Hindus to a comparatively narrower narrative space is in my view 
emblematic of the marginal position they actually occupy in a society dominated by 
the brahmins. With the third unit, the description of Kanthapura and its (Hindu) 
population ends. One is thus left in no doubt that in Kanthapura there is not a single 
man or woman belonging to a faith other than Hinduism. In short, Kanthapura is a 
Hindu village.  
The story begins to unfold in the fourth unit which is technically the first 
narrative unit. Three years back from the time of actual narration, the protagonist of 
the novel, Moorthy, discovers ‘a half-sunk linga,’ which is then housed in a temple 
hastily built for that purpose, triggering off a series of Hindu festivities culminating in 
Harikathas.
62
 It is through one of these Harikathas (which forms the second half of 
the fifth unit) that Gandhi enters the small and as yet unpoliticised psyche/world of 
(Hindu) Kanthapura. The chapter/unit ends with the last-moment entry of the 
policeman Badè Khan, who is sent by the colonial government to live in Kanthapura 
so that he can closely monitor the impact of Gandhian politics on the Kanthapurians.   
Now, if Kanthapura is India and all its inhabitants are Hindus, the message is 
clear: the Indian nation-in-the-making is a nation of Hindus, with brahmins and non-
brahmins joyfully (though not equally) appropriating ‘the nation-space’ between 
themselves.
63
 Despite being the last of all the characters to enter Kanthapura, Badè 
Khan and, by extension, the community he belongs to might have become at least one 
of the many ‘fragments’ of the nation, if Rao had willed so, one must add. In choosing 
                                                          
60
 As a postcolonial concern, geography/space is no less crucial than history/time. As Said has argued: 
‘The main battle in imperialism is over land, of course.’ Culture xiii. 
61
 Rao, Kanthapura 10. The name of Bharatha links India to its Aryan/Hindu past, Bharatha being the 
name of Lord Rama’s younger brother in the epic Ramayana. Incidentally, it is also the official 
Sanskrit name of India. 
62
 Rao, Kanthapura 7. As Rao himself explains the term in the Notes appended to the American edition 
of the novel (which I am using here), Harikatha means ‘[l]iterally, story of God.’ 189.  
63
 The term is from Homi K. Bhabha, ‘DissemiNation: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern 
nation’ in Bhabha 294. 
  
Md. Rezaul Haque. The Nation and One of Its Fragments in Kanthapura. 





Badè Khan to embody the evil – the narrator describes it as ‘the serpent of the foreign 
rule’ –  against which Gandhi has been expressly sent by Brahma, ‘God of Gods,’ to 
wage war, Rao recoils from allowing him/them even that minority status.
64
 Although 
inspired by the kind of politics Gandhi stood for, in its execution Kanthapura is both 
an unhealthy appropriation and an unpleasant distortion of history in that whereas 
Gandhi had relentlessly worked for Hindu-Muslim harmony to the very end of his 
life, the author of Kanthapura seems to work for a completely opposite outcome.
65
 
Why else should he have chosen a Muslim character to play the villain in a work 
whose primary concern is to imagine the Indian nation? With the Congress already in 
power in 1937, could it be that in 1938, the year of publication of Kanthapura, the 
question of Hindu-Muslim unity was no longer so crucial a vector in the calculus of 
anticolonial national struggle as it had been even a decade earlier?
66
 
At least three very powerful objections can be raised against what I have so far 
said about Rao and his novel. First, it can be argued that Badè Khan is not the only 
villain in Kanthapura. There are other (Hindu) characters as well in the novel who are 
depicted in as negative a light as Badè Khan. That is to say, to choose to single out the 
villainy of Badè Khan is a distortion in itself. Secondly, it is possible to argue that 
Badè Khan is not meant to represent the Muslim community of India. To take him as 
such – that is, as a representative Muslim character – is to misinterpret authorial 
intent. As a member of the colonial police force, he is rather part of the colonial 
government against which the villagers of Kanthapura inspired by Gandhi and his 
followers are struggling. If anything, then, Badè Khan should be seen as standing for 
one of the repressive apparatuses of the colonial state. And finally, the treatment of 
Badè Khan at the hands of the villagers, it can be further argued, has nothing 
communal in it. Even if he had been a Hindu, there would have been no difference. In 
those heady days of anticolonial national struggle, whosoever had acted on behalf of 
the British would have been treated likewise by the Indians. In other words, the 
villagers of Kanthapura treat Badè Khan as a villain not because he is a Muslim but 
because he is a collaborator who works for the perpetuation of colonial hegemony 
rather than its end. For to serve the ‘small alien minority’ of white sahibs in any 




Although powerful, these objections are not hard to refute. In what follows, I 
attempt to construct a counter-argument, mainly focusing on the portrayal of the 
villainous characters in the novel. As to the first and third objections, it is true that 
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Kanthapura does have villains other than Badè Khan, but it is also true that they are 
treated differentially. The two characters who have no truck with what they call 
‘Gandhi business’ and are bold enough to say so are the priest-turned-moneylender-
cum-landowner Bhatta and the Swami, a rather shadowy figure.
68
 Both work together 
(in the name of religion) to foil the success of ‘Gandhi business’ by all means. Bhatta 
plays an underhand role in the arrest of Moorthy, while it is the Swami who is to 
blame for the death of his mother. Yet neither Bhatta nor the Swami appears to be as 
despicable to the villagers of Kanthapura as Badè Khan who is after all on duty there. 
Bhatta is more fortunate than the Swami in that he is never supposed to have anything 
to do with the white masters. When the pariah women set his house on fire, it is not 
because he is finally identified with what Badè Khan has come to represent (that is, 
the repression of the colonial state) but because his high interest rate has ruined most 
of them. The narrator explains: 
 
Well done, well done; it is not for nothing Bhatta lent us money at 18 per cent 
and 20 per cent interest, and made us bleed … he has starved our stomachs 
and killed our children … Well done, well done.69 
 
In addition, there is a clear tendency both in the author and the narrator to play 
down the wickedness of both. The narrator is explicit about why Bhatta has become 
what he is now. In his case, the two sources of corruption are his frequent visits to the 
city and love of money. Previously, the reader is informed, ‘Bhatta was a fine fellow 
for all that. With his smiles and his holy ashes, we said he would one day own the 
whole village.’70 So Bhatta is not a born criminal. Since his aberration is temporary, 
there is every possibility of his coming back to the path of virtue. The possibility is 
translated into reality when Rao sends (a supposedly repentant) Bhatta on a 
pilgrimage to Kashi immediately after the arrest of Moorthy, though the narrator 
remains a little sceptical about its final outcome.  
A slightly different strategy is employed to make light of the foul play of the 
Swami. Although it is no secret that ‘the Swami is a Government man,’ the (open) 
secret is in circulation only in the city.
71
 Thus the authority of the Swami as the 
spiritual leader of his community, though challenged in the city, remains secure in the 
orbit of Kanthapura. Rangamma, who is ‘no village kid,’ is chosen ‘the third member’ 
of ‘the Congress panchayat committee of Kanthapura,’ and herself organises a Sevika 
Sangha – that is, an association of female volunteers – has real difficulty to come to 
terms with the idea that Gandhi wants caste-system to go.
72
 She cannot accept that 
Gandhi has approved of ‘all this pollution’ resulting from ‘the confusion of castes.’73 
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By doubting the Gandhian stand on the caste question, Rangamma is in effect 
endorsing, though not as forcefully as Bhatta, the authority of the Swami in such 
matters. Even Moorthy who suffers considerably as a consequence of his 
excommunication by the Swami does not characterise him as a villain. In comparison, 
Badè Khan is not so fortunate. He remains a villain from the moment of his entry into 
Kanthapura/Kanthapura to the very end. Except for one indeterminate moment when 
he comes to join the bhajan that Moorthy asks Rangamma to organise after his fast, 
Badè Khan is never allowed to betray a single redeeming feature. The recurrent use of 
animal imagery in the characterisation of Badè Khan is in effect a refusal to grant him 
humanity.
74
 He ‘growl[s],’ ‘prowl[s],’ is a ‘bearded monkey,’ a ‘bearded goat,’ a 
‘dog,’ and so on.75 Badè Khan is further divested of humanity by way of 
metonyms/synecdoches: often he is no more than ‘a beard, a lathi, and a row of metal 
buttons.’76 
The second objection that there is nothing communal in the characterisation of 
Badè Khan is also easily refuted. In his depiction of Badè Khan, Rao is prejudicial, 
subscribing to the stereotypes of the (Indian) Muslims generated by colonial 
discourse, a tendency from which his portrayal of Hindu characters is remarkably 
free.
77
 Moorthy, for example, is a man of action.
78
 Instead of being resigned to fate, he 
takes responsibility for what he himself does as well as what others do under his 
leadership. His decision to ‘fast for three days’ after the disastrous outcome of the 
first skirmish is a result of his realisation that ‘much violence ha[s] been done because 
of him.’79 This image of a responsible Indian/Hindu is the obverse of what one comes 
across in colonial discourse (for example, in the short stories of Rudyard Kipling). In 
contrast, true to the colonial image of Indian Muslims, Badè Khan is given both to 
sensuality and violence.
80
 As if to emphasise how strong these (Muslim) proclivities 
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are, they are made to come to the fore on the very day of Khan’s arrival in 
Kanthapura. The narrator reports:  
 
At the temple square he [Badè Khan] gave such a reeling kick to the one-eared 
cur that it went groaning through the Potters’ street, groaning and barking 
through the Potters’ street and the Pariah street, till all the dogs began to bark, 





There is certainly a touch of humour in the effect of the kick on the other animals. 
However, contrary to what humour frequently does, here it does not work to lessen 
the culpability of the agent of violence, for it is an act of heedless violence: together 
the scene (a place of Hindu worship) and the victim (a mute animal and ‘one-eared’ at 
that) of violence deprive the humour of its intended effect. In fact, it is held back at 
the precise moment from what it might have achieved in terms of comic relief, and 
then turned on its head instead. In the process, humour becomes black humour. After 
all, who would welcome an animal, if not its own species? It is not for nothing that 
there is such a preponderance of animal imagery in the portrayal of Badè Khan. If it 
were humour pure and simple, Rao would not allow his narrator to talk about the 
lechery of Badè Khan immediately after she has so artfully captured his propensity for 
violence. 
 With nowhere to live in Kanthapura, Badè Khan goes ‘straight’ to the nearby 
Skeffington Coffee Estate where the owner of the Estate (a European) gives him a hut 
to live in.
82
 No sooner has the problem of accommodation been fixed, Khan goes out 
and procures ‘a Pariah woman among the lonely ones.’83 The woman ‘[brings] along 
her clay pots and her mats and her brooms,’ and makes the best use of each of these 
items: in addition to doing cleaning and cooking for Khan, she gives him ‘a very 
warmful [sic] bed’ as well.84 One may still remain doubtful if Rao is really working 
with the colonial stereotypes of Indian Muslims, for to generalise from a single 
example is always suspect. But doubt gives place to conviction when ‘a young Badè 
Khan’ comes to join ‘the bearded one.’85 Khan the junior repeats what Khan the 
senior has done previously: ‘he too [takes] a hut and a woman and settle[s] down in 
the Skeffington Coffee Estate.’86 Lechery is a Muslim monopoly in Kanthapura!  
The communal element in the portrayal of Badè Khan is too marked to be 
missed. Of all his physical features, none is as frequently singled out as his beard. The 
recurrence of the feature is so obtrusive that one must pause to think out its possible 
significance. One must pause to ask, ‘What is extraordinary about the beard of Badè 
Khan, an ordinary policeman?’ It is extraordinary only in the sense that it is one of the 
most visible markers of a (pious) Muslim in the Indian subcontinent. Symbolically, 
the beard of a Muslim is taken to be as sacred as the holy thread of a (brahmin) 
Hindu. To jeer at a Muslim’s beard would generate as great an outrage as to laugh at a 
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(brahmin) Hindu’s sacred thread.87 In both cases, the insult is likely to be judged on a 
communal rather than personal level. On most occasions in Kanthapura, Badè Khan 
is insulted with specific reference to his beard. In due course, the tendency 
degenerates into a crude equation: to defy Badè Khan is to pick at his beard. In the 
very first scuffle between the Gandhians (the nationalist force headed by Moorthy) 
and the non-Gandhians (the anti-nationalist colonial force led by Badè Khan), both 
parties engage in ‘a battle of oaths,’ hurling obscenities at each other, whose targets 
remain unspecified.
88
 The only exception is Badè Khan who is identified by no other 
means but by his beard: ‘Oh, you bearded monkey.’89 Eventually the parties come to 
blows:  
 
Badè Khan swings round and–bang!–his lathi has hit Moorthy and his hands 
are on Moorthy’s tuft, and Rachanna and Madanna cry out, ‘At him!’ and they 
all fall on Badè Khan and tearing away the lathi, bang it on his head. And the 
maistri comes to pull them off and whips them, and the women fall on the 
maistri and tear his hair, while Moorthy cries out, ‘No beatings, sisters. No 
beatings, in the name of the Mahatma.’ But the women are fierce and they will 
tear the beard from Badè Khan’s face.90 
 
How may one explain why the women choose to tear the maistri’s hair but Badè 
Khan’s beard? Is there really nothing communal in it? In attracting the violence of the 
non-violent Gandhians, the beard of Badè Khan becomes a site more of communal 
violence than of anticolonial national struggle. The sub-text of communal prejudice 
gets exposed here.  
It is important to note that Kanthapura, though written between 1929 and 
1933, was actually published in 1938. As can be seen from the discussion of the 
historical context of the novel above, by then the political situation in India had 
greatly changed. Of the new developments, the most remarkable one was the rapidly 
shifting positions of rulers and ruled in terms of political power, a phenomenon more 
true of the Congress than of any other political party of the time. By virtue of being 
already in power in the majority of provinces of British India (seven out of eleven) in 
1937, the Congress could legitimately claim itself to be the voice of all India.
91
 It was 
thus in a position to define, if not dictate, the terms of negotiation with its colonial 
counterpart. At a time when Indian nationalism was clearly the more legitimate 
political force than its imperial opponent, what need could there possibly be for Rao 
to choose a dark-skinned Muslim instead of a fair-skinned sahib as the villain of 
Kanthapura, a novel much celebrated for its depiction of anticolonial national 
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struggle in the Indian context? At the turn of the nineteenth century when Indian 
nationalism was just beginning to make itself felt at an all-India level for the first time 
in the history of India, it was apt that its exponents judiciously avoided direct 
confrontation with the most formidable imperial power in modern history. For several 
decades after its birth in 1885, for example, the Congress practiced what historians 
have sardonically called the politics of petitions and prayers, that is, a moderate form 
of negotiation. In the arena of culture, the articulations of nationalism were as muted. 
In order to articulate its call for national regeneration, revivalist historical fiction 
(mostly written at the turn of the nineteenth century) had to combine allegory with 
romance, apparently undermining historicity only to bring about (for the nation) the 
moment of its entry into history. (That moment arrives in nationalist historical 
fiction.) Evidently the times of Kanthapura were very different from those of 
revivalist historical fiction in both Britain and India. Even though the Second World 
War, which would ultimately cause the dissolution of the European empires, was just 
looming on the horizon, Britain, shattered by the trauma of the First World War and 
shaken by the economic depression of the 1930s, was more or less in a subdued mood 
both at home and in her colonies where the tendency to resort to repression could still 
be seen every now and then. The Government of India Act of 1935 is an eloquent 
testimony to the fact that Britain was indeed in a mood of conciliation in India.  
Yet the author of Kanthapura is hesitant to call a spade a spade when there is 
apparently no need for it! If it did not arise from an overt need for narrative 
improvisation, one cannot but ask, then what else could possibly have led Rao to 
deflect white villainy onto brown skin in Kanthapura? Why does the novel have a 
Muslim villain at all? Badè Khan is, in the final analysis, an inverse projection of 
what R.K. Ramaswamy, the narrator-protagonist in The Serpent and the Rope, terms 
‘Brahminic autocracy.’92 In simple terms, ‘Brahminic autocracy’ is what Sethi has 
called ‘chauvinist Hinduism,’ coupled with upper-caste male/patriarchal prejudices. It 
has four basic components. First, Hinduism is far superior to any other religion of the 
world, including even those born of Hinduism itself (e.g. Buddhism, Jainism and 
Sikhism). While the other religions (especially the monotheistic ones such as Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam) seek God, Hinduism alone seeks Truth. Secondly, Truth is not 
readily available to all Hindus. Only the brahmins have a privileged access to it. 
Thirdly, Truth has a masculine face. And finally, Hindus are the only legitimate 
inhabitants of India. Rao is proud of his Aryan ancestors but seems oblivious of the 
fact that the Aryans themselves were outsiders. For Rao the arrival of the Aryans in 
India is not a source of irritation, while it is in the case of Others, especially the 
Muslims.  
One may argue that the Rao of Kanthapura is not the Rao of The Serpent and 
the Rope, if only because the two novels are separated by a period of more than two 
decades.
93
 True, but it is equally true that the Rao of the first novel is also the Rao of 
the second in embryo.
94
 If The Serpent and the Rope is a full-blown illustration of 
                                                          
92
 Rao, The Serpent 148. 
93
 The Serpent and the Rope came out in 1960 and won the Shahitya Akademi Award of the year. 
94
 Rao offers an interesting contrast to Rabindranath Tagore. Unlike Tagore, who moved from the 
lyricism of earlier years to the prose of later years, from the ivory tower of art to the sordid reality of 
life, from individual longing to collective belonging, from escape to engagement, Rao moves the other 
way round, from politics to metaphysics, from a half-hearted dalliance with Marxism to a full-fledged 
  
Md. Rezaul Haque. The Nation and One of Its Fragments in Kanthapura. 





‘Brahminic autocracy,’ its intimations are unmistakable in Kanthapura, especially in 
its conceptualisation of the Indian nation.
95
 It is perfectly in tune with the later 
development of Rao that the nation in Kanthapura is selective in terms of caste/class, 
community, and gender. While the ‘fragments’ of the nation Sethi deals with – 
peasants and women –  have at least been recognised as ‘fragments,’ the community 
of Indian Muslims is not (deemed authentic enough to be) even a ‘fragment’ of the 
nation Rao envisions in his novel. If the absence of Muslim men and women in the 
village of Kanthapura is one proof of the exclusionary logic informing the imagining 
of the nation in Kanthapura, the vilification of Badè Khan, the only Muslim character 
of any consequence in the novel, is another.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
In Inventing India: A History of India in English-Language Fiction, Ralph Crane 
discusses Rao’s Kanthapura along with E.M. Forster’s A Passage to India and Ruth 
Prawer Jhabvala’s Heat and Dust in a chapter significantly titled ‘Bridges.’96 The 
grouping is premised on two assumptions. First, the historical period of all the three 
novels is more or less the same. Secondly, together they offer a comprehensive view 
of the then India. If Forster’s India is predominantly British, Rao’s is primarily 
‘Indian,’ while Jhabvala’s is perhaps both. As Crane reads them, all the three novels 
are concerned with building bridges (hence the title of the chapter): A Passage to 
India and Heat and Dust between East and West, while Kanthapura between ‘the 
various Indian communities.’97 Given the communal configuration of the Indian 
nation-in-the-making in Kanthapura, it is difficult to accept the conclusion Crane 
draws about the novel. To be true to the spirit of the work in question, one has to 
admit that the India in Kanthapura is not ‘Indian India’ but Hindu India and that it 
builds bridges not between ‘the various Indian communities’ but between the various 





                                                                                                                                                                      
dedication to Vedanta, from a brief affection for Gandhian ideology to a lasting attachment to whatever 
Gandhi opposed in Hinduism such as ‘Brahminic autocracy.’ In short, while Tagore grows in 
humanism and liberalism, Rao in chauvinism and parochialism.   
95
 K.R. Srinivasa Iyengar gets it right when he argues that ‘Kanthapura, The Serpent and the Rope, and 
The Cat and Shakespeare make a trilogy, and present a steady progression in Raja Rao’s own 
sādhanā.’ ‘Literature as Sadhana: A Note on Raja Rao’s The Cat and Shakespeare,’ in Sharma 108. 
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Fiction (London: Macmillan, 1992) 75-99. 
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